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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
SOUTH SANPETE SCHOOL DISTRICT,

)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,)
)

v.

)

Civil No. 15946

)

DON K. BARTON, et al.,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sued to condemn lands and water of
defendant.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The court determined that the plaintiff did not
have power to condemn water rights; after a jury trial, the
court authorized plaintiff to take the lands it sought from
defendant for the total sum of $40,000 just compensation
determined by the jury.
RELIEF ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks an order affirming the judgment of
the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-respondent will follow the convention
adopted by defendant-appellant of referring to the record,
transcript and exhibits as (R

),

(Tr.

) , and (Ex.

)

,

respectively.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiff sought to obtain 24.49 acres in Manti
City, owned by defendants, for the construction of a high
school.

In October, 1977, the plaintiff Board of Education

adopted a resolution authorizing the acquisition of the
property by eminent domain, and after some unfruitful
negotiations this action was filed October 25, 1979.
Plaintiff sought also to obtain water; the court
ruled that plaintiff did not have power to condemn water,
and this led to a jury verdict less than the amount alleged
in the complaint as the value of defendant's property.

It

is the usual practice in Manti, when selling land, to sell
corresponding shares of the local irrigation company,
representing water rights (Tr. 134, Ex. 16,17).

The issue

regarding water rights was made explicit in the pretrial
order (R. 55-56, paragraphs 1, 2.3, 2.4).

At the time of

trial, the court ruled that the Board did not have the power
of eminent domain with respect to the water rights mentioned
in the pretrial order (R. 77).

There arose a sharp dispute

among the experts about the value of the water, the
plaintiff's experts holding that without water, $1,000 per
acre should be deducted from the value of the land as
calculated from comparable sales with water (Tr. 201), while
the defendant's expert held that no adjustment should be
made to the value for the lack of water (Tr. 111).

The jury

verdict was phrased as follows:
We the jurors impaneled in the above entitled
case find the issues in favor of the land-
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owners and against the plaintiff and assess
damages as follows:
Value of the land and improvements without
water, taken by the School Board -$40,000.00.
(R. 65)
The court enetered judgment on the verdict and this appeal
followed.
I

THE JURY VERDICT PROPERLY GRANTED THE RELIEF TO WHICH
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VALUE OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT
Defendant complained in his statement of facts
that the jury verdict was less than the amount alleged in
the complaint as the value of the subject property.

This

was explained by Mr. Austin, one of plaintiff's appraisers,
as a result of the inclusion of the value of water in the
value of land.

The distinction between the value of water

and the value of land was later made clear in the pretrial
order, and when the court ruled that the water was not
subject to eminent domain, a considerable amount of the
value of the property was lost.

Utah Rules of Civil

Procedures 54(c)(l) provides:
Except as to a party against whom a judgment
is entered by default, every final judgment
shall grant the relief to which the party in
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even
if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings.
Furthermore, if the allegation of the complaint was in any
sense evidence, it was up to the parties to introduce it
before the jury, which was not done.

Therefore, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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determination of the jury that the value of the land alone
was $40,000 was not erroneous.

II
THE COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED PLAINTIFF TO REBUT EVIDENCE
OF A MIXED GIFT-SALE AS A SALE OF COMPARABLE PROPERTY
Defendant introduced evidence of a real estate
transaction which he now contends led to error.

The

problems with this evidence began when the defendant's
expert witness, Marcellus Palmer, mentioned a sale by Grant
Cox to the LDS Church of one acre for $10,000 as a sale of
property comparable to the subject property.

On cross-

examination, it developed that this sale had not been
concluded and that it involved more than one acre; Mr. Cox
also was to give adjoining property to the Church.

The

following testimony was given.
Q.

(Mr. Bushnell) Were you advised that Mr. Cox,
in selling that property to the Church,
likewise gave a donation of additional
property for tax purposes in that same
immediate tract?

A:

I don't know that I could say that.
I knew
his reasoning for doing it.
I understood
there was to be a gift involved.

Q.

Of adjoining property?

A.

I'm sure it would be adjoining property.

Q.

For which no consideration would be given?

A.

A gift would indicate that, alright.

(Tr.

122)
Later, the court stated that the gift-sale by Grant Cox was
not relevant.

Then plaintiff requested permission to put on
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Wilbur Cox, the local stake president, to rebut the
testimony of Palmer about the transaction.

Wilbur Cox

testified that the transaction was not completed and that it
involved the purchase by the Church of a part of five acres
and a gift from Grant Cox to the Church of the remainder of
the five acres.

No objection to any specific part of the

testimony of Wilbur Cox was interposed by defendant,
although defendant objected to calling him as a witness.
(Tr. 285-87)
Defendant cross-examined Wilbur Cox at length,
eliciting from him testimony about remarks of Grant Cox
which might be hearsay but to which plaintiff did not object
(Tr. 289 lines 7-11) that others were present in these
conversations besides Grant Cox, and that as far as the
witness knew, the matter was still in negotiation between
Grant Cox's attorney, Arthur Nielsen, and the Church Real
Estate Department.

At the conclusion of Wilbur Cox's

testimony, plaintiff moved for admonition to the jury to
disregard the testimony of Wilbur Cox, which was denied, the
court explaining out of the hearing of the jury as follows:
[I]t's already before the jury and such a
motion would be confusing to the jury and
. . . expert testimony has heretofore been
given and it has not been used as a
comparable sale and, on this basis the court
denies the motion.
(Tr. 297-298)
Defendant complains in his brief that the court
erred in several respects in treating the Cox gift-sale.
The following reasoniGg establishes that the court did not
err with respect to this transaction:

(l) Defendant raised
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the issue of the Cox gift-sale;

(2) the Cox gift-sale was

not a sale of comparable property;

(3) the court did not

improperly prevent defendant from presenting evidence in his
case-in-chief to support the comparability of the Cox giftsale;

(4) the court did not improperly interfere with the

cross-examination of Mr. Cloward with respect to the Cox
gift-sale;

(5) the court did not abuse its discretion in

allowing Wilbur Cox to testify; and (6) the court did not
improperly fail to require Grant Cox to testify, nor did the
court preclude erroneously the rebuttal of Wilbur Cox's
testimony about the intent or motive of another.
2.1

Defendant raised the issue of the Cox gift-

sale.
The defendant's expert, Mr. Palmer, referred to
the Cox gift-sale as a comparable sale which supported his
appraisal during his direct examination by defendant's
counsel.

His testimony represented the transaction as a

sale of one acre for $10,000.

All the argument about this

transaction and whether the trial court handled it properly
should be understood in this light, that is, that defendant
presented misleading evidence to the effect that a certain
property had sold at a fair market price of $10,000 per
acre, when actually the transaction included a large gift,
the price per acre of the property bought was fixed
arbitrarily, and the infirmities of the transaction as a
sale of comparable property were known to plaintiff's
counsel and his expert witness in advance.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2.2

The Cox gift-sale was not a sale of

comparable property
One of the prerequisites of a comparable sale is
that it be a sale and not some other type of transaction,
such as a gift, a judicial foreclosure, or a sale under
compulsion of the power of eminent domain.
Dist. v. Boening, 267 Ill. 118, 107 N.E.

In Sanitary

810 (1915),

evidence of a sale of comparable land was refused, because:
(1) Part of the consideration for one of such
sales was given in exchange for the owner's
agreement to assist the purchaser in building
a switch track, and (2) the other sale consisted of two blocks of land sold together,
the purchaser agreeing to divde arbitrarily
the price between the two blocks.
(118 ALR
891)
The Cox transaction has the same defects; i.e., that there
is additional consideration for the $10,000 besides the one
or two acres which were nominally purchased for that price,
in the property which was given to the Church from adjoining
land; and (2) the allocation of $10,000 purchase price to
the one or two acres to be purchased was apparently
arbitrary and not based on any reasoning which could be used
to demonstrate the value of the land.

It could be inferred

that the Cox land was worth anything from $2,000 per acre to
$10,000 per acre if it were to be immediately developed (as
opposed to the speculative development of the defendant's
land).

This indefiniteness rendered the Cox transaction

irrelevant, because it did not tend to prove or disprove any
material fact bearing upon value, as required by Utah Rules
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of Evidence 1(2).

This indefiniteness also would have led

to improper speculation by the jury.
There was expert testimony that one acre was not
comparable as a matter of size, which further impaired the
usefulness of the Cox transaction.

(Tr. 270)

Stating the issue in simpler terms, the Cox
transaction was not a sale.

There is no authority in Utah

law for comparing the consideration which changed hands in a
gift-sale of lands for purposes of establishing just
consideration for similar lands.
transaction must be a sale.
§

To be comparable, the

7 Nichols on Eminent Domain,

8.05(2) at 8-16.19
A further weakness of the Cox gift-sale trans-

action was tnat 1t had not been completed at the time of the
trial herein.

It was apparently more in the nature of an

unexercised option; money had been placed in escrow, and the
seller had assured the buyer that the land would remain
available (Tr. 295 lines 9-10) but the seller required
assurances that a church building would indeed be placed on
the site (Tr. 290 lines 2-4) and the transaction was still
in negotiation (Tr. 295 lines 24-30).

The sales price in an

option contract is not admissible as evidence of the value
of comparable land.

City of Wichita v. Jennings, 199 Kan.

621, 433 P.2d 351 (1967).

Nor is evidence admissible of an

offer which has not been accepted.
Domain,

§

7 Nichols on Eminent

8.05(2)(b)(i) at 8-16.3.
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Thus, the court properly held the Cox gift-sale
irrelevant and inadmissible as evidence of the value of
comparable property.

The defendant's expert, Mr. Palmer,

had already referred to it in support of his appraisal,
however, before all the details of the transaction were
before the court, and the evidence was thus before the jury.
We shall have more to say on this subject in later
paragraphs.
2.3

The Court did not improperly prevent

defendant from presenting evidence in his case-in-chief
supporting the comparability of the Cox gift-sale.
At a certain point in the presentation of the
defendant's case-in-chief, the court limited the number of
comparables which the defendant might introduce.
THE COURT:
Is there any need of going into
those others, the other twenty-two?
MR. FRISCHKNECHT:
If he were allowed to say,
your Honor, he tried to say that there were a
couple of others that he feels are applicable.
THE COURT:

Do you want to bring two more in?

MR. FRISCHKNECHT:

That's correct.

THE COURT: All right.
more.
(Tr. 91)

I'll limit you to two

The defendant then produced evidence of a sale in Fairview,
Utah, and of the Cox gift-sale.

Palmer testified as follows

about the Cox transaction:
Q.

(~r. Frischknecht) Do you feel, Mr. Palmer,
that with regard to the size of the location
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and the other factors that that sale for one
acre for ten thousand dollars is comparable?
A.

(Mr. Palmer) Well, it's got some elements of
comparability in that it's right close to and
adjacent the subject property.
That makes it
more comparable than going some distance
away.
I think it's pertinent.
It's one
that needs to be considered.

Q.

Mr. Palmer, in this area or with this
relationship to the City of Manti and the
subject property, are you familiar or did you
find other sales in that area?

A.

Yes. I found and looked at other sales in the
area, north and east and west of Manti.

Q,

Did you consider those other sales?

A.

Yes, I sure did.

Q.

In your opinion, Mr. Palmer, are those sales
comparable to the subject property?
MR. BUSHNELL: If the Court please I object to
that.
I thought we were going into two and
now we're going into whole groups in a
generalized approach.
I think this is
improper and beyond the scope that he said he
would go to.
MR. FRISCHKNECHT:

Your Honor--

MR. BUSHNELL:
If he said he used them or
didn't use them, we've got to go into the
question of trying to disqualify them and
show the dissimilarities which is just too
far afield.
(Tr. 100-102) (emphasis added)
The foregoing recital of the evidence clearly
sustains the conclusion that the Court's order was to
restrain defendant from discussing comparables other than
the Fairview property and the Cox gift-sale, rather than to
interfere with testimony about the comparability of the Cox
transaction, as defendant complains in his brief.

Thus 1t
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is not accurate to state that the defendant was "unable to
go into the matter fully during his case-in-chief."
Defendant's brief at 5.
2.4

The Court did not improperly interfere with

the cross-examination of Mr. Cloward with respect to the Cox
gift-sale.
Defendant asked Joseph Cloward, one of plaintiff's
appraisers, several questions about the Cox gift-sale on
cross-examination.

Cloward stated that he didn't think the

transaction was comparable because of the gift involved.
Defendant asked him if he knew when the gift had been made.
Cloward said he didn't know, and then plaintiff objected to
the line of questions on the grounds that Cloward had
testified that he had not used the Cox transaction as a
comparable and that he knew nothing about it except what he
had heard in court.

The following ensued:

THE COURT: What do you claim, Counsel? Is
this relevant? You're posing things to him
that he has no knowledge of. The only thing
he knows is what he's heard since he's been
here and he said he didn't consider it and
wouldn't consider it based on what he's heard
since he's been here. Now, I don't see where
it's relevant from that point on.
I don't
want to limit you but that's how I feel about
it.

MR. FRISCHKNECHT: Well, your Honor, they
have testified that there's some notion of a
contribution here and I think I asked the
question, that's true, and he started into it
and I'd like to find out what he knows, your
Honor.
THE COURT:
But you asked him if he knows and
he said he didn't know. Hell, if you don't
know, just say you don't know, Mr. Cloward,
and then we'll go on to the next quest1on.
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Q.

Do you know, Mr. Cloward, when the property
was sold to the Church that we have been
referring to?

A.

The only knowledge I have was the sale to the
Church that has been stated here today.

Q.

Did you hear Mr. Palmer testify that in
approximately March of this year that
transaction occurred?

A.

I couldn't testify to all that I've heard
today.

Q.

Would it surprise you, Mr. Cloward, if I were
to tell you that that contribution made to
the Church was made three or four years ago
and has nothing to do with this transaction?

A.

As I stated before, I didn't know that.
I
didn't consider the sale and haven't
considered it, and I probably wouldn't have
considered it.

Q.

You haven't considered it?

(Tr. 269-70)

At this point the court broke in with the remark cited by
defendant in his brief to the effect that the Cox gift-sale
was not relevant and instructing defendant to leave his line
of questioning.

Then defendant, abandoning his line of

questioning about the time of the Cox gift-sale, asked the
following question:

Q.

(By Mr. Frischknecht) The acreage of one
acre, according to your testimony, is not
comparable because of the size; is that
correct?

A.

I wouldn't consider it to be.

(Tr.

270)

It is thus clear from the record that this question
pertained also to the Cox gift-sale, but it did not pertain
to the line of questioning stopped by the judge about the
witness's knowledge of the timing of the sale.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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We have already argued at length in part 2.2 of
the brief that the court properly held the Cox gift-sale
transaction to be irrelevant as a comparable sale.

It

appears from the above excerpt from the record that the
court's ruling during the cross-examination of Cloward
pertained only to a repetitive and argumentative line of
questions posed to Mr. Cloward (see McCormick on Evidence,
§

7 [2d Ed. 1972]) and that the judge was well within his

discretionary powers in directing defendant to another line
of questions.

Further, it appears that defendant was

permitted to continue with questions about the Cox
transaction.

Thus it is not accurate to say that "Appellant

was precluded by the Court" from cross-examining the Board's
appraiser about the Cox gift-sale.
2.5

(Defendant's brief at 3)

The Court acted within his powers in allowing

Wilbur Cox to testify about the Cox gift-sale.
There are several reasons why the court acted
properly in allowing defendant to call Wilbur Cox to testify
about the Cox gift-sale.

(1) His testimony was proper

rebuttal; it was necessary because defendant had raised the
Cox gift-sale as an issue in the jury's mind.

(2) As a

rebuttal witness, he was not subject to the requirement that
his identity be disclosed to defendant prior to trial.

(3)

There was reasonable cause in the record, apart from the
personal knowledge of the judge, to support plaintiff's
motion to allow Wilbur Cox to testify.

(4) Defendant waived

any objection he may have had to Wilbur Cox's testimony by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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his cross-examination.

(5) There was no improper emphasis

placed on Wilbur Cox's standing in the community.

(Tr. 287)

(6) Defendant cannot now complain about the content of
Wilbur Cox's testimony, because he did not object to it.
(Tr. 287-97)
At the end of the first day of trial, plaintiff
told the court that it had one rebuttal witness left.
281)

(Tr.

On the second day of trial, plaintiff informed the

court that the witness would be Wilbur Cox, who would
testify about the Cox gift-sale.

Objection was made by

defendant's counsel, who conceded that rebuttal witnesses
were not subject to the requirement in the pretrial order of
disclosure prior to trial.

Defendant's attorney stated:

. . plus the fact that the Court made a
Pretrial Order on the basis that there should
be no witnesses called except those that were
named 1n the Pretrial Order except for
rebuttal . . .
(Tr. 283)
Proper rebuttal evidence is that "which tends to
answer or explain" the adversary's evidence.

Soliz v.

Ammerman, 16 Utah 2d 11, 395 P.2d 25, 26 (1964).

On direct

examination by plaintiff, Wilbur Cox said his name, his
residence, that he was retired, that he had recently been a
stake president, that he had been involved in obtaining a
site for a church building, that five acres were involved,
that some was to be purchased and some obtained by gift from
Grant Cox, that the transaction had not been completed, and
that the price of $10,000 had been allocated to part of the
acreage involved at Grant Cox's request.

When asked whether
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the structure of the transaction "had to do with tax
considerations," the witness testified:
that."

(Tr.

"I'm not sure of

287-88)

On redirect examination, Wilbur Cox testified that
his interest had merely been to get the five-acre tract for
a reasonable price.
Q:

(Mr. Bushnell)
So far as the Church is
concerned, when you were in that official
capacity, did it really matter to you how the
money was allocated so long as you got the
five acres for a reasonable amount?

A:

No, sir.

(Tr. 297)

When compared with the testimony of Marcellus
Palmer, that the transaction was a sale of one acre for
$10,000, which included a gift of adjoining property (Tr.
101, 122), it is clear that the testimony of Wilbur Cox
explained the defendant's evidence within the rule of
Soliz v. Ammerman, supra, that it was proper rebuttal, and
that therefore Wilbur Cox was not a witness whose disclosure
prior to trial was required by the pretrial order.
Furthermore, the record before the jury was
incomplete and misleading prior to the testimony of Wilbur
Cox, because it was not clear how many acres were involved
in the gift-sale.

This reason was given by the trial court

as justification for allowing Wilbur Cox to testify, in
response to the objection by defendants to the court's
mention of its personal knowledge of the circumstances.

The

Court said:
I feel that counsel for the landowner had
knowledge prior to these proceedings that
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this was not a comparable sale in that it
covered five acres and the one acre was sold
for ten thousand dollars, and I feel that
evidence to clear up this matter should be
heard by the jury and that is the basis for
this ruling.
(Tr. 285-86) (emphasis added)
The defendant had presented evidence of a
comparable sale which proved to be irrelevant.

Defendant

claims, in effect, that once the comparable was held
irrelevant, plaintiff could not rebut it or explain it.

A

similar claim was made in Jenson v. S. H. Kress & Co., 49
P.2d 958 (Utah (1935).

The plaintiff was asked in rebuttal

whether she had said to another witness, Peterson, that she
had "crowded against the glass and evidently broke it?"
This was objected to as improper rebuttal.

The court

pointed out, however, that Peterson had been erroneously
required to answer an earlier question and in his answer had
testified that plaintiff had admitted breaking the glass.
The Court said:
The difficulty was that the first error above
mentioned opened the way for what followed;
but the door having been opened, and Peterson
therefore having necessarily testified as to
what was in effect an admission, the plaintiff must be permitted to rebut it.
(49 P.2d
at 962).
Thus the testimony of Wilbur Cox was properly allowed to
explain to the jury the circumstances surrounding the Cox
gift-sale, even though that transaction could not be used as
a comparable sale.
In cross-examining Wilbur Cox, defendant rehearsed
the Cox gift-sale transaction thoroughly and in considerably
greater detail than on direct examination, pursuing
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questions not raised on direct examination, such as hearsay
conversations (Tr.

289) about the terms of the agreement, a

description of the documents involved, the identity of
persons privy to the negotiations, whether the witness
considered the land to be actually worth $10,000 per acre
(Tr. 294 lines 9-18), and so forth.
Appeal and Error

§

It is written in SA CJS

1735 at 1032 (1958) that:

Error in admitting evidence which has been
presented by or on behalf of one party is
cured where practically the same evidence or
evidence having essentially the same
probative effect is afterward
. . elicited
on cross-examination.
2.6

The court did not improperly fail to require

Grant Cox to testify, nor did the court restrain defendant
from rebutting Wilbur Cox's testimony.
Defendant states in his brief that the court
permitted Wilbur Cox to testify about Grant Cox's religious
and tax motives "without even requiring that Mr. Grant Cox
testify as to his motives," (defendant's brief at 5).

The

defendant complains further that the court prohibited him
"from rebutting the testimony of Mr. Wilbur Cox."

(Id.)

The record shows, however, that Wilbur Cox did not testify
about Grant Cox's tax motives (Tr. 288) and that testimony
about religious motive was elicited by defendant on crossexamination (e.g. Tr. 293).
The court did deny a continuance requested by
defendant who claimed that Grant Cox was out of town, that
Grant Cox was the only witness who could rebut Wilbur Cox's
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testimony, that defendant anticipated what Wilbur Cox's
testimony would be, and that there was nothing in the record
which supported the judge's remark that the contract
involved in the Cox gift-sale could be produced in court.
(Tr. 283-84)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 40(b) provides:
If the motion [for continuance] is made upon
the ground of the absence of evidence, such
motion shall also set forth the materiality
of the evidence expected to be obtained and
shall show that due diligence has been used
to procure it. The court may also require
the party seeking the continuance to state,
upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he
expects to obtain.
The defendant did not state what material evidence he hoped
to obtain from Grant Cox.

Although the record did not show

at the time of the judge's ruling that there were documents
which might be obtained bearing upon the issue, the
defendant subsequently elicited testimony from Wilbur Cox
that there were documents in escrow in Manti Bank bearing on
the transaction (Tr. 289,295).
Nowhere does defendant say, either now or at
trial, that the testimony of Wilbur Cox is not truthful;
nowhere does he say that the testimony of Grant Cox would
correct errors in the testimony of Wilbur Cox.

Instead he

insists that it "colored" the jury's view of the case.

This

falls woefully short of a showing of prejudicial error; an
attack upon a judgment and verdict must show an error which
is substantial and prejudicial, in the sense that there is a
reasonable likelihood that in its absence, the result would
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have been different.

Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24

Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970).

Defendant has shown

neither error nor prejudice, and his attack should fail.

III
THE COURT PROPERLY PREVENTED OGDEN FROM
TESTIFYING ABOUT HIS EMPLOYMENT
The end of the first day of trial defendant called
Dee Ogden as a witness.

Plaintiff approached the bench and

represented to the judge, out of hearing of the jury, that
Mr. Ogden had been retained by the plaintiff School District
as an appraisal witness and had been paid a fee for his
appraisal, but that the School Board had chosen not to call
him as a witness at the trial.

Therefore, the plaintiff

moved the court for an order:
To prevent Mr. Ogden from, in any way,
testifying or the defendant landowner from
asking the witness that his appraisal was
made for the School Board, or that Mr. Ogden
was paid a fee. •
(Tr. 279)
The court further explained his ruling as follows:
The motion is granted and it looks to me like
it would not be proper and I think I would be
com~itting prejudicial error to allow this to
go Ln.
You can call him for an appraisal but
not to give testimony that he was employed by
the School District or make any reference to
the School District's paying him so you may
get his appraisal, but that's the limit of
it, Mr. Ogden.
(Tr. 271,280)
The employment of Dee Ogden by the school district was
irrelevant and immaterial to the issues of the case.

The

defendant proposed to put Dee Ogden on as an appraiser; the
issue to which his testimony would have been relevant was
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the fair market value of defendant's property.

It made no

difference to the fair market value of the property whether
the District had employed Ogden.
1(2).

Utah Rules of Evidence,

A party may have consulted with many experts prior to

trial; what defendant proposes to do is to find the expert
in that group consulted by plaintiff whose testimony will be
most to defendant's liking, and then introduce the
testimony, claiming in the hearing of the jury that the
witness is really plaintiff's, but plaintiff has tried to
conceal the evidence from the jury.

Plaintiff may have

quite legitimate reasons for not using the expert, e.g.
doubts about his competence, but will have difficulty
persuading the jury of them.

Under these circumstances, the

question of a witness's prior employment is a prejudicial,
collateral matter and thus the trial court's ruling can be
sustained simply because the proposed evidence was not
relevant.
Defendant suggests that Ogden's credibility was in
issue.

It would have been, had Ogden been called to the

stand, but defendant never called him.

Furthermore, even if

Ogden had been called as a witness, the court had power to
stop defendant from introducing evidence about his prior
employment on the grounds that the evidence went to his
credibility.
Under the common law, it would not have been
possible for defendant to call Dee Ogden and then impeach
him by showing his bias by evidence of his employment by a
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party.

McCormick on Evidence,

§

40 N.96 (2d Edition, 1972).

Part of the rationale for this common law rule was that:
The party, by calling the witness to testify,
vouches for his trustworthiness.
McCormick,
supra, § 38.
In Utah the rule against impeaching one's own
witness has been modified by Utah Rules of Evidence, 20 and
45, which provide as follows, in pertinent part:
Subject to Rules 21 and 22, for the purpose
of impairing or supporting the credibility of
the witness, any party, including the party
calling him may examine him and introduce
extrinsic evidence concerning any statement
or conduct by him and any other matter
relevant upon the issues of credibility.
(Utah Rules of Evidence 20).
This broad abrogation of the common law rule is somewhat
modified by Utah Rules of Evidence 45(b) which states:
Except as in these rules otherwise provided,
the judge may in his discretion exclude
evidence if he finds that its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the risk that
its admission will . • . (d) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of
confusing the issues or of misleading the
jury • • • •
To determine whether the judge properly exercised the
discretion conferred on him by Rule 45, we should examine
the record to see whether any arguments were made to him by
the defendant at the time he made his ruling which would
clearly support the contention that he acted erroneously.
There were no compelling considerations mentioned by
defendant in his argument to the trial judge.

(Tr. 279,280)

Furthermore, the record does not support the claim
of defendant that Ogden would have given an in-between
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appraisal.

The record is devoid of any evidence or

representation as to what the appraisal of Ogden would have
been.

Assuming that Ogden would have given an appraisal

higher than that of the other witnesses called by plaintiff,
the evidence offered by Ogden presented a double edged sword
to the defendant.

If Ogden was called as an expert and his

relationship to the district was not disclosed, his evidence
could simply discount that of Marcellus Palmer who gave his
opinion that the property was worth $6,600 an acre, or that
of the owner, who stated in his opinion the property was
worth $8,000 an acre.

On the other hand, if the opinion was

in the middle ground and it were revealed to the jury that
Ogden was in fact an employee of the plaintiff and that his
appraisal was higher than that of plaintiff's other
appraisers, then the jury might be confused as to whose
witness Ogden was and conclude that the plaintiff contended
that the value of the property was that given in Ogden's
appraisal.

It is submitted that this latter state of facts

was what the defendant sought to bring about by calling
Ogden as a witness.
In any event, the question of Ogden's being an
employee of the plaintiff Board could not have added clarity
to this situation but would have only confused the jury.

By

calling Ogden as an expert, the defendant would then have
vouched for his credibility and should not have been in a
position to need evidence about his credibility, not even to
establish the partiality of plaintiff.

It is presumed in
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lawsuits that the parties are not impartial.

Indeed, at

common law the parties were disqualified from testifying
because of their natural bias.

The adversary relationship

of parties is still a fundamental assumption of our legal
system.

Thus, the prior employment of Ogden was irrelevant

and prejudicial and the court should affirm the trial
court's order excluding it.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE APEX SALE
Defendant's expert witness offered to give
evidence of a "full city block sold • . . By Apex Hatchery".
(Tr. 70)

Plaintiff offered to prove that the sale had been

under threat of condemnation, and the court decided to hear
the proof outside the hearing of the jury.

(Tr. 72)

The

superintendent of the plaintiff School District, Ronald E.
Everett, then testified that he had negotiated with Morgan
Dyreng for the purchase of some lands of Manti-Apex Hatchery
Co. which the School District had selected for the
construction of an elementary school.

During the course of

the negotiations, Mr. Everett told Mr. Dyreng that it was
the policy of the School District to negotiate the purchase,
if possible, and then, if necessary, to acquire the property
by condemnation.
Q.

Mr. Everett testified as follows:

(Mr. Bushnell) Was there any question about
condemnation?
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Q.

Tell us about it.

A.

Well, on the second meeting with Mr. Dyreng,
it was necessary for us to explain to him the
policy of the Board that if peaceful negotiations were not complete, that we would
condemn the property for the use .
(Tr.
75)

On cross examination, defendant's counsel elicited that the
School District had paid $25,000 less for the Apex property
than the appraisal (Tr. 77), and that Mr. Dyreng had
requested some time to consider the matter further after Mr.
Everett had mentioned the possibility of condemnation.
Then, after a few days, Mr. Dyreng accepted an offer from
the School District.

(Tr. 79)

Upon hearing this evidence

the court ruled that the Apex sale was not admissible.
Oef~ndan:

conceded in his argument that there were

chicken coops on the Apex property (Tr. 83) which
distinguished it from the defendant's land.

The defendant

testified in cross-examination, after volunteering that the
Manti-Apex property had sold for $7,000 an acre, that--

Q.

(Mr. Bushnell) That had many, many improvements on it, didn't it?

A.

(Mr. Barton) There's some old worn out
chicken coops there, that they don't use any
more.

Q.

It had improvements on it.
agricultural land, was it?

A.

The land had been vacated because the coops
that were on it were not in use.
(Tr. 179)

It wasn't vacant

Plaintiff believes that the court did not err w1th
regard to evidence of the Apex sale, for the following
reasons.

(1) There is no basis in the record for the
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conclusion that the court improperly refused to hear the
testimony of Morgan Dyreng regarding the sale.

(2) The Apex

sale was under threat of condemnation, and therefore
evidence of it was properly excluded.

(3) Sale of improved

property is not comparable for purposes of valuing
unimproved property.

The Apex sale involved a city block on

which were constructed chicken coops, while most of
defendant's land was vacant and only a "little section" of
defendant's land had improvements on it.
18 slide 3, Ex. 14, 21)

(Tr. 39, 102, Ex.

And although defendant's land lay

within the city limits, it had not been platted into blocks.
Thus it was within the discretion of the judge to exclude
evidence of the Apex transaction.
4.1

The Court did not improperly refuse to hear

the testimony of Morgan Dyreng
After Ronald E. Everett testified that the Apex
sale had been under threat of condemnation, defendant argued
that Morgan Dyreng should be called as a witness, stating-MR. FRISCHKNECHT:
I think if justice is
done, [Mr. Dyreng] ought to be here • . . so
we can see what he says about condemnation
but, Your Honor, in lieu of that, as another
alternative if you don't see f1t to allow us
to bring Mr. Dyreng in here tomorrow, then I
would say that what Mr. Everett says is that
they talked to him about condemnation and
they say they'll go back to the Board and
talk about it, and make up a
resolution . . • • I think what . . • Mr.
Everett says is enough to show that Mr.
Dyreng looked at the situation and said,
"Either I sell to them or I'm in a
condemnation action."
The only way we're
going to know that is to have him here, Your
Honor, and I would request that we be allowed
to bring Mr. Dyreng in and have him respond
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to it and, if not, I don't think
they've met the burden
(Tr. 81-82)
(Emphasis added)
Twice in the foregoing argument defendant's attorney offered
the court an alternative to his request to produce Morgan
Dyreng, in effect inviting the court to rule on the issue
without hearing Dyreng.

The defendant should not now be

able to predicate error on the court's ruling without
Dyreng's testimony.

See, Meier v. Christensen, 15 Utah 2d

182, 389 P.2d 734 (l964)("The court's comments on the
evidence were invited by plaintiff's attorney with no
objection thereto whatever.
on that account."

So we cannot reverse this case

389 P.2d at 735)

Nowhere does the record show that the court
explicitly ruled that Morgan Dyreng could not be called as a
witness, as proposed by defendant.

We are left to speculate

what the court would have done if the defendant had called
Morgan Dyreng as a witness to rehabilitate the Apex sale as
a comparable.

To save a question for review, it must be

presented to the trial court and a ruling invoked thereon.
Lovato v. Hicks, 74 N.M. 733, 398 P.2d 59 (1965).

Defendant

had a duty to pursue whether Dyreng could be called as a
witness and obtain an order that he could not be before he
can base a claim of error on the trial court's action,
especially in the light of defendant's arguments in the
alternative, inviting the court to rule without Dyreng's
testimony.

Lilenquist v. Utah State Nat. Bank, 100 P.2d

185, 190 (l940)("No ruling on [exemplary damages] was made
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by the trial court, hence the question is not before us.")
Where evidence is proposed and objected to and the court
postpones ruling on its admissibility, and the proponent of
the evidence fails to thereafter press his demand for a
ruling on its admissibility, the evidence is deemed
abandoned by its proponent.
App.

McElwain v. Schuckert, 13 Ariz.

468, 477 P.2d 754, 756 (1970).
Nor does the record show that defendant made known

the substance of the testimony he expected from Morgan
Dyreng sufficiently to raise an inference of error under
Utah Rules of Evidence 5, which provides-A verdict or finding shall not be set aside,
nor shall the judgment or decision based
thereon be reversed, by reason of the
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless (a) it
appears of record that the proponent of the
evidence either made known the substance of
the evidence in a form and by a method
approved by the judge, or indicated the
substance of the expected evidence by
questions indicating the desired answers
• • . (emphasis added)
In particular, defendant did not offer proof that Dyreng
would contradict Everett in any particular, or that Dyreng
would rebut the inference that the threat of condemnation
had been communicated to him by Everett.

In Downey State

Bank v. Majer-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978), the
intervenor Ringwood argued that he had improperly been
prevented from showing that a certain lien was void.

The

court said:
Ringwood, however, made no proffer of what
the excluded testimony would have
demonstrated.
A judgment will not be
reversed for an alleged error in the
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exclusion of evidence unless it appears in
the record that the error was prejudicial.
Ringwood's failure to make a proffer of proof
as to what his evidence would show precludes
him from asserting on appeal that the
exclusion was error.
(578 P.2d at 1288
(emphasis added)
Like Ringwood, the defendant herein failed to offer proof of
what Dyreng would testify, and therefore defendant should
not be able to claim error from the episode.
Utah Rules of Evidence 5, quoted above, sets out a
procedure which must be followed to place the trial court in
error with respect to the exclusion of evidence.

The

purpose of the procedure is to give the court an opportunity
to correct his error during the trial.

Plaintiff submits

that the defendant has not shown a basis in the record for
his claim of error with respect to the Apex sale.
4.2

The Apex sale was under threat of

condemnation, and therefore evidence of it was not
admissible.
In State v. Christensen, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371 P.2d
552 (1962), the State appealed from an award in a
condemnation case in part on the ground that the judge had
required a witness to answer a question about severance
damages relating to another tract which had been acquired by
the state.

The court said-A sale of land to the State for highway
purposes, by agreement of the parties, to
avoid a condemnation suit is a forced sale
and therefore is not admissible in evidence
to show the value of other s1milar property
being condemned.
(371 P.2d at 556) (emphasis
added)
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In the case at bar the defendant complains that he should
have been permitted to use the Apex sale, and that the Apex
sale was merely characterized as one entered into to avoid a
condemnation suit.

The court below held, however, that--

It's the court's opinion that the sale would
be in contemplation of condemnation. The
court will not allow the testimony regarding
that sale.
(Tr. 85)
This decision of the trial court should not be disturbed
unless clearly erroneous.

See, State v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d

317, 452 P.2d 872 (1969); State v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295,
495 P.2d 817 (1972).

Plaintiff respectfully submits that

the record supports the action of the trial court.
4.3

A sale of improved property is not comparable

for purposes of valuing unimproved lands
It is established by the record that all but a
small piece of the defendant's property was unimproved,
while there were improvements on the Apex property.
Nichols on Eminent Domain,

§

In 7

8.05[2] at 8-16.8 that--

It is the generally accepted rule that
evidence of the sale price of the improved
property cannot be admitted to prove the
value of unimproved property.
This rule was explained in Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 110, 139
(1962), as follows:
[In Re Housing Authority of Newark, 126
N.J.L. 60, 17 A.2d 812 (1941), the court
excluded evidence of some improved lands in a
suit to condemn an unimproved tract and] held
that the trial judge properly ruled that as a
matter of discretion that the evidence was
inadmissible, since to go into arithmetical
computations of value of neighboring land as
distinct from buildings, for purposes of
comparison
ofFunding
value,
by provided
taking
price
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of another tract consisting of land and
buildings as a subtrahend, and requiring the
jury to ascertain from probably conflicting
testimony the value of such buildings and
deduce the value of such other land by
subtracting the value of the buildings from
the total sale price would introduce issues
not fairly relevant to the inquiry.
The
court continued that the general rule was
that for sales of neighboring or adjoining
land to be comparable as indices of value of
land taken there should be a substantial
similarity of conditions. (emphasis added)
That the question of valuing the improvements on the Apex
property would have produced conflicting evidence is
apparent from the testimony of defendant Barton, when on
cross-examination he volunteered the Apex sale as a basis
for his opinion of the value of the subject property.

(Tr.

179)
Defendant complains that the plaintiff improperly
cross-examined him at this point, because the court had
earlier ruled that the Apex sale was inadmissible.
Defendant is in no position to complain, however, because
the record clearly shows that the Apex sale was first
mentioned by him in response to the question whether he knew
of any sales which would justify his opinion that his
property was worth $8,000.00 per acre.

(Tr. 178)

Defendant

did not object to the line of questions asked him at that
time and therefore plaintiff believes that there is no
error.
A further problem inherent in the Apex sale is
that the defendant's property is a tract of 24.49 acres,
without streets and with little or no access to existing
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water hookups, while the Apex property is a developed city
block.

Platted or subdivided land is not admissible to

prove the value of unplatted acreage.

State by Dept. of

Highways v. Schrenkendgust, 551 P.2d 1019 (Mont. 1976).
Thus, plaintiff believes that the court properly
prevented the jury from considering the Apex sale because
the Apex land was improved, both with buildings and as a
platted city block with streets and services.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has argued in the preceding pages that
the trial court did not err in any of the matters mentioned
in defendant's brief.

Plaintiff does not believe that there

was any prejudice resulting to defendant, in a legal sense,
from these matters;

it is incumbent upon defendant to show

(1) error, and (2) prejudice, that is that the verdict would
have been different had the alleged error not occurred or
had been cured.
With respect to the admissibility of evidence of
comparable sales, this court has said-Whether the other sale meets that test is for
the trial court to determine; and he is
allowed considerable latitude of discretion;
and his ruling will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it appears clearly that he was
in error.
This case falls within the framework of the
fundamental principle: that what the parties
are entitled to is a fair opportunity to
present their respective cases to a court and
jury for determination.
When this has been
accomplished, all presumptions favor the
verity of the verdict and the JUdgment; and
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this includes all aspects of the conduct of
the proceedings, and rulings of the court.
The burden is upon the appellant . . . to show
not only that there was error, but that it
was substantial and prejudicial in that he
was in some manner deprived of such full and
fair presentation and consideration of the
disputed issues.
Redevelopment Agency of
Salt Lake City v. Mitsui Investment, Inc.,
522 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 1974) (emphasis
added)
The court was well within its discretionary powers, in the
view of plaintiff, to exclude both the Cox gift-sale and the
Apex sale from the case.

Furthermore, because there are no

clear inferences of valuation arising from either of these
transactions upon the record, it is not apparent that had
they been fully brought before the jury, that the jury could
properly have reached a different verdict.

Both trans-

actions would certainly have raised collateral issues, as to
the apportionment of value between sale and gift in the Cox
gift-sale, and as to the apportionment of value between
improvements of land in the Apex sale, which would have been
confusing for the jury.
Therefore plaintiff respectfully urges the court
to sustain the judgment.
Respectfully submitted,

B~if!f/~nd/&:j
s.

_I

Dan
Bushnell
i/
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Plaintiff-Respondent's Attorneys
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
521-3680
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-32-

Served two copies of the foregoing brief by mail
this

~fhday

of June, 1979, upon defendant's attorneys, at

the following address:
Arthur M. Nielsen
Clark R. Nielsen
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-33-

